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DIVORCE- JURISDICTION OVER NONRESIDENTS
Arkansas. Jurisdiction, once validly obtained by a court, is
not readily relinquished, as the case of Altshuler v. Altshuler'
illustrates. Separation of a New York married couple was accom-
panied by an order of the New York court for support of wife
and child by the husband. During the following year the wife
established residence in Arkansas and secured a divorce decree
providing for a $200 per month support allowance for wife and
child. She then returned to New York, and apart from her
Arkansas stay neither of the parties had residence in any state
other than New York. Some years later the wife was granted an
additional allowance by the New York court, making a total in
that court of $115 per month. Consideration was given to the
Arkansas support decree for $200 monthly. Upon remarriage
of the wife, Arkansas reduced the monthly support allowance to
$150, based solely on the support of the son. The husband then
obtained a reduction in New York from $115 to $50 per month.
Whereupon the Arkansas court, on motion by the wife, absorbed
the $65 per month reduction effected by New York into a new
Arkansas decree, raising the allowance from $150 to $215 per
month. The husband appealed on the grounds that the Arkansas
action should have been dismissed because New York was the
proper forum, and that the allowance award was excessive.
The court held that, as the trial court had obtained unques-
tioned jurisdiction of both parties and subject matter in the orig-
inal divorce suit, the court retained jurisdiction for purposes of
adjusting allowance for support and custody. The court could
not say that the trial court's discretion had been abused.
Divorce proceedings are not exclusively in personam or in
rem, being regarded as in personam for the purpose of binding
1 .--------- Ark .-............ 258 S. W . 2d 545 (1953).
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the defendant personally and in rem to affect the status of the
parties.2 In any event, there is continuance of jurisdiction over
parties and things throughout all subsequent proceedings which
arise out of the original cause of action
In what manner jurisdiction in personam was obtained with
regard to the husband, to allow a valid judgment in personam
for support of wife and child, was not discussed. It has been
noted that if a personal judgment for support of children is
entered, it would have to be upon jurisdiction of the person of
the father on one of the recognized grounds, such as presence
or domicile.'
Based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens some courts
have refused to entertain jurisdiction where a suit is between
nonresidents or aliens.' The reasons vary and include the belief
that the matter can be tried better elsewhere. But the determina-
tion of the question whether an action should be dismissed on the
ground that another forum is more convenient involves the exercise
of judicial discretion.6
The matter of excessive allowance was dismissed after con-
sideration of the amount necessary to support the child and the
ability of the husband to pay.
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT - PENAL AND CIVIL JUDGMENTS
FOR SUPPORT
Arkansas. Two Arkansas cases enunciate the distinction be-
tween full faith and credit to a civil judgment and full faith and
credit to a criminal judgment.
In Berger v. Berger7 a wife sought recovery for an amount due
2 17 AM. JUR., Divorce, § 9.
3 Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U. S. 346 (1913) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1934) §§ 76, 105.
4 STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1951) 344.
5 Id. at 169.
6 14 AM. JUR., Courts, § 230.
7 - Ark... . . 261 S. W. 2d 259 (1953).
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under a Connecticut judgment rendered against the husband for
non-support. Recovery was denied because the judgment was
unenforceable by the wife in Connecticut. The proceedings there
were not instituted in the name of the wife but constituted a crim-
inal prosecution in the name of the state.
In Rice v. Rice' a wife obtained a separate maintenance decree
in New York with provision for support allowance. Five years
later the husband obtained a divorce in Arkansas, following con-
structive service of process on the wife. After the divorce, the
New York court, on petition by the wife and with constructive
service on the husband in Arkansas, increased the support allow-
ance. Two judgments then existed against the husband, one on the
delinquent installments prior to the increase in allowance, and
the other on the delinquent installments subsequent to the in-
crease. Both judgments were entered after constructive service
on the husband in Arkansas. The court held both judgments
entitled to full faith and credit.
It is well settled in common law jurisdictions that the courts
of one state do not enforce claims arising under the penal laws
of another.' The Restatement of Conflict of Laws is in agree-
ment.1" While recovery was denied in Berger v. Berger because
of the penal nature of the judgment, there was no penal judgment
involved in Rice v. Rice. The suits in the latter case were insti-
tuted in the name of the wife, and the judgments were enforceable
by her in New York.
In the Rice case the Arkansas court was faced with the prob-
lem of determining whether the New York court had jurisdiction
in personam over the husband to increase the support allowance
and enter valid judgment with respect to delinquent installments
of the increased allowance. The leading case of Michigan Trust
s .-........Ark ..... 262 S. W. 2d 270 (1953).
9 GOODRICH, CONFLICTr OF LAWS (3d ed. 1949) 24.
10 § 443.
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Co. v. Ferry" was cited and quoted by the court: ".... if a judicial
proceeding is begun with jurisdiction over the person of the party
concerned, it is within the power of a state to bind him by every
subsequent order in the cause." The New York statutes in fact
authorized the court to retain jurisdiction over the husband in
separate maintenance actions.
It was held that the Arkansas divorce decree, based upon con-
structive service, could not, for want of personal service, affect
the wife's right to support by the husband under New York law.
This view is in accord with a relatively recent United States
Supreme Court decision. 2
TESTAMENTARY CHARITABLE GIFTS - INVALIDITY IN STATE OF
TESTATOR'S DOMICILE - EFFECT ON GIFTS OF LAND
IN OTHER STATES
Texas. In the case of Toledo Society for Crippled Children v.
Hickock"8 petitioners, an Ohio charitable institution and others,
attempted to establish rights under the will of an Ohio resident with
respect to land and mineral estates in Texas. An Ohio statute in-
validates gifts to charitable institutions made in wills executed
less than one year prior to the testator's death. There is no such
statute in Texas. The trial court held the gifts valid with respect to
the Texas property. The court of civil appeals reformed the judg-
ment,'4 denying relief to the petitioners on the ground that their
interest was contingent rather than vested. The Texas Supreme
Court held that Texas law applied and the gift to the Ohio
charity was valid.
A portion of the Texas land was partnership property. Under
a partnership agreement this land was to be transferred, in ex-
11228 U. S. 346, 353 (1913).
12 Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541 (1948).
'
8 
.......-Tex -------------- 261 S. W. 2d 692 (1953).
14 252 S. W. 2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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change for corporation stock, to a corporation to be organized
by the partners. The agreement referred to the possibility of
death of the partners and provided that such occurrence would
not preclude incorporation. Two weeks after the death of the
testator-partner, incorporation was effected, and a short while
thereafter the properties were transferred and the stock certifi-
cates issued.
The children of the testator contended that there had been an
equitable conversion from realty to personalty by virtue of the
agreement to transfer the Texas property into corporation stock,
and that all reference in the will was to "funds" rather than
"real property." It was argued that no interest in "real property"
descended under the will, but rather an interest in "personalty;"
consequently, the law of the domicile, Ohio, should have been
applied, and the gift to the charity held invalid. The petitioners
maintained that it was a matter of simple devise of real property,
the law of the situs applying.
The court was of the opinion that the issue of equitable con-
version is determined by the law of the land, in this case Texas.
There is no dispute on that point. The writers and the cases are
in almost unanimous agreement that it is the law of the situs that
determines whether equitable conversion has changed realty into
personalty or personalty into realty.15 The misunderstanding and
confusion exists with the consideration of the situation arising
directly after the situs determines that equitable conversion has
transformed the realty into personalty. Does such a conversion
mean that the situs court must then look to the law of the domicile
on the theory that the law of the domicile applies with regard to
personalty? The court in the present case held in the negative.
Although it admitted that Texas recognizes the doctrine of equita-
ble conversion, such conversion was said to be immaterial where
15 See Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186 (1900) ; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935)
§ 249.1; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1949) 509; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF
LAWS (1934) § 209.
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there was a conflict of laws consideration; where the question was
which state law to apply. The reasoning advanced was:
... this body of law is really private international law and not merely
a system for operation between the common or English law states of the
United States or between these and common or English law nations.
Thus to use as a basis for selection of a particular law between conflict-
ing laws a doctrine which may not even exist in some jurisdictions is
obviously less desirable than a more realistic basis such as the movable
or immovable character of the object in question. As argued by the
petitioners, it would in some cases result in state or nation A deferring
to the law of state or nation B, when the latter in a converse situation
would not reciprocate.' 6
The court compared the equitable conversion doctrine with the
movable-immovable consideration as a basis for a choice of laws
and preferred the latter. Is this not really a choice between realty-
personalty and immovable-movable, two concepts so often used
interchangeably? It would appear so, since what the equitable
conversion doctrine ultimately decides is whether the interest
involved is realty or personalty.
Stumberg asserts that the problem of choice of laws rests on
the determination, by the court of the situs, of the interest under
the will as "movable" or "immovable" and that such classifica-
tion is not the same as that of personalty or realty. 7 The courts
of the situs are said to have the final control in determining
whether an interest is movable or immovable. Once determined
to be an immovable, or interest in an immovable, reference should
be made to the law of the situs alone. The immovable, being of a
fixed, unchanging location, is so closely identified with the situs
as to preclude application of the law of another state.
However, the view has also been noted that where there is an
equitable conversion- of realty into personalty or personalty into
realty, the property is, for the purpose of the choice of laws, to be
16 261 S. W. 2d at 701.
17 CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1951) 409.
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regarded as of that species into which it is converted by the will. i"
This is supported by the case of Ford v. Ford,9 which held that
directions in a will to sell Wisconsin land and invest the proceeds
in Missouri land resulted in a double conversion from Wisconsin
land to money to Missouri land, with the Wisconsin Rule Against
Perpetuities then being inapplicable.
Professor Cook ascribes much of the confusion regarding the
effect of the equitable conversion doctrine to loose and inaccurate
use of terminology.2" He considers the expressions of the courts
to the effect that when a valid contract for the sale of land has
been made, the land is converted into personal property and the
personal property, or money, is converted into land. This is de-
scribed, not as a "legal fiction," but as a misleading description
of results. The "conversion" does not take place at all, in actual-
ity or in fiction; what the cases actually decide is that the right
which the vendor had against the vendee for the purchase price
has vested in his personal representative. The legal title vests in
the heir, but, since the vendor was in equity holding the title pri.
marily as security for the payment of the purchase price, the bene-
fit of the "lien" passes to the vendor's personal representative
along with the right to the purchase price.
Although Goodrich is noted by the court as being alone among
the text writers to accept the conversion thesis, he too states that
interests in property are classified, for the purpose of applying
rules of conflict of laws, as either movables or immovables.2
Immovables are said to be generally considered as equivalent
to realty, but the term also includes other interests which, in other
fields of law, may be treated as personalty. The Restatement of
Conflict of Laws is apparently in agreement, although there is
some ambiguity in the use of the word "law" when it is said in
18 11 AM. JUR., Conflict of Laws, § 96.
19 70 Wis. 19, 33 N. W. 188 (1887).
20 "Immovables" and the "Law" of the "Situs," 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1246 (1939).
21 CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1949) 24.
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Section 249, "A will of an interest in land is governed by the law
of the state where the land is in spite of a direction in the will to
convert the land into personalty." Does this law include the con-
flict of laws rule of the state of the situs, or is it the law that would
be applied in purely domestic situations? This expression should
be considered in conjunction with Section 8, which states, "All
questions of title to land are decided in accordance with the law
of the state where the land is, including the Conflict of Laws rule
of that state." The ambiguity of Section 249 appears resolved by
Section 8: in the present case Texas should apply its conflict of
laws rule, which can only mean that it must apply Ohio law if
that is the choice dictated by the status of the interest descending
under the will. What was the status of this interest under Texas
law? It was personalty, as the court readily admitted. Should
Texas then have held that Ohio law governed? The answer is in the
negative if it is remembered that the issue determining which law
governs is not that of realty or personalty but that of immovable
or movable. The classification of personalty did not alter the im-
movable character of the interest. Thus it would appear that despite
the court's insistence that application of its conflict of laws rule
takes effect independent of the doctrine of equitable conversion,
the same result would be reached by applying the Texas conflict
of laws rule after consideration of the true effect of the doctrine.
If there is fault to be found with the opinion, it lies not with
the holding but with the supporting argument. The court contended
that to apply a doctrine which may not even exist in other juris-
dictions would result in state A deferring to the law of state B
when the latter in a converse situation would not reciprocate. Was
this attitude law or politics? When state A holds, for example, in
a case involving citizens of state B that its tort law does not recog-
nize responsibility without fault in a particular situation, should it
be concerned whether state B would recognize the same doctrine?
The rules of conflict of laws of a state are not affected by the atti-
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tude of another state towards rights or other interests created in
the former state.22
The Ohio judgment was denied full faith and credit on the
ground that Texas need not give full faith and credit to a judg-
ment rendered by a state which is not the situs of the land.
A leading United States Supreme Court case,28 cited by the
court, holds that, for purposes of full faith and credit, the courts
of South Carolina could not decide that an interest in Connecticut
land was personalty and thereby cause Connecticut courts to lose
jurisdiction thereof. The theory was that to hold otherwise would
violate the rule that the law of the situs governs testamentary suc-
cession to land.
George Galerstein.
2 2 RIESTATEMFNT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934) § 6.
28 Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186 (1900).
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